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Audit committee (AC) financial experts is considered one of 
the important corporate governance mechanisms due to their 
vital role in overseeing companies’ financial reporting procedures 
and enhancing corporate financial decisions. Regulators and 
policymakers require Omani firms to have at least one director 
with financial expertise sitting on ACs. Therefore, we aim to 
investigate the effect of AC financial expertise on corporate 
financial decisions (capital structure, dividend payment and cash 
holdings). We use a data set of all Omani financial institutions 
(36 firms) listed on the Muscat Stock Exchange (MSX) over 
the period from 2014 to 2019, consisting of 216 firm-year 
observations. The paper contributes to the growing body of 
the literature by being the first study to examine the impact of 
AC financial expertise on financial decisions. The study also 
contributes to the literature by integrating multiple theories: 
agency, resource dependence and signalling, to enlighten 
the effect of the unique power of financial expertise on making 
financial decisions. We find that AC members with financial 
expertise are positively related to the level of cash holdings, 
leverage and dividend payment in financial companies. 
The findings provide empirical evidence to regulators to 
encourage companies to exceedingly appoint financial experts as 
AC members due to their unique resources, which improve their 
monitoring role and constraining management opportunistic 
behaviour. 
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Efficient corporate financial decisions are the main 
responsibility of the boards of directors (BODs) 
(Trinh, Elnahass, Salama, & Izzeldin, 2020). Many 
regulations and legislations have been imposed on 
BODs to assist them in their role of making financial 
decisions. Therefore, the corporate governance (CG) 
code in Oman has introduced several strict 
provisions for the audit committee (AC) directors to 
be more effective in providing high-quality financial 
decisions to the board. One of the most important 
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characteristics is to have at least one director on  
the AC with financial expertise, to enhance 
the effectiveness of the board’s financial decisions 
(Al Lawati, Hussainey, & Sagitova, 2021). Therefore, 
this paper aims to examine the impact of AC 
financial expertise on financial decisions. 
Although AC members play two important 
roles: monitoring and advisory roles, a dearth of 
studies has been found on the advisory role of 
the AC directors (Qiao, Chen, & Hung, 2018).  
With their unique expertise, these directors would be 
able to offer ultimate advice on “expertise-related 
policies” and develop a more strong and solid 
“internal control system and risk management 
framework” (Sultana, 2015). This paper contributes 
to the literature of AC financial expertise and 
concentrates on three financial decisions: dividend 
pay-out, cash holdings, and capital structure. 
Starting with the dividend policy, it is 
considered one of the important financial decisions 
that AC could help the board in deciding on it. 
Possessing financial expertise, these directors could 
exercise their advisory role in making optimal 
decisions. Due to the voluntary nature of the dividend 
policy in Omani financial institutions (CMA, 2015), 
the board faces dilemmas in whether to pay or 
withhold the payment of dividends to their 
shareholders (Elmagrhi et al., 2017). On the one hand, 
paying an excessive amount of a company’s  
profit to shareholders as dividends will reduce 
a company’s growth opportunity. On the other hand, 
leaving excessive free cash under management’s 
control will create agency problems between 
managers and shareholders. Hence, we argue that AC 
directors with financial expertise could enhance  
the counterbalance between distributing the profit 
to shareholders and holdings some free cash in 
the company to invest for potential future growth. 
Moving to cash holdings, cash is considered 
an important component of a company’s current 
assets, especially when accessing the capital market 
is constrained and when the demand for borrowing 
is high. Board directors with AC members need to 
collaborate to make ultimate decisions on whether 
to invest the full amount of the excessive cash on 
a profitable investment or hold some cash back to 
the company for future investment when external 
financing cost is high or unavailable (Ranajee & 
Pathak, 2019). The literature states that corporate 
cash holdings affect firm value as it is subject to 
the agency problem (Jensen, 1986). Managers could 
easily spend excessive cash in damaging projects  
to increase their benefits, building an empire 
reputation, at the cost of shareholders. Shareholders 
are aware of the agency problems created by  
the existence of free cash, hence, they require 
additional monitoring mechanisms to protect their 
wealth and interests. The existence of AC directors 
with financial expertise would enhance the decisions 
taken by the board and also reduce the agency 
problems.  
Regarding corporate capital structure, it is 
a very important sign of the effectiveness of the CG 
quality in the company (Detthamrong, Chancharat, & 
Vithessonthi, 2017). Detthamrong et al. (2017) state 
that if a company is too leveraged (due to weak CG), 
a financial crisis could occur. Therefore, companies 
need to have financial expertise on AC to make  
the “optimal composition of debt in their capital 
structure in order to maximize the benefits against 
the costs of future financial distress, which 
increases with the use of debt financing” 
(Detthamrong et al., 2017, p. 690). Thus, our paper 
addresses the following research question:  
RQ: Do AC directors with financial expertise 
have an impact on corporate financial decisions in 
Omani financial institutions?  
Financial decisions are very important 
corporate decisions made by the BODs and they  
are affected by information asymmetry between 
managers and shareholders, which could be 
significantly improved by the existence of financial/
accounting experts. This article offers several new 
contributions to the existing literature. First,  
we respond to a recent call by Al-Hadi, Eulaiwi, 
Al-Yahyaee, Duong, and Taylor (2020) to examine 
the impact of AC expertise on corporate financial 
decisions in Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC). Hence, 
we provide empirical evidence on the impact of AC 
financial expertise on corporate financial decisions 
in Omani financial institutions. By investigating this, 
we depart from the traditional studies (e.g., Rao, 
Al-Yahyaee, & Syed, 2007; Fernandez, Kumar, & 
Mansour, 2013; Al Ani & Al Amri, 2015; Singh, 2016; 
Al-Najjar & Clark, 2017) which examine the impact of 
company characteristics, such as profitability, firm 
size, and liquidity on financial decisions. We also 
contribute to the literature by focusing on the other 
angle of the AC role, the advisory role, which is 
a “distinctive dimension”. Second, we integrate 
agency, signalling, and resource dependence 
theories to explain the influence of the unique 
power of financial expertise on making financial 
decisions. Third, we contribute to the literature by 
focusing on the financial institutions for a unique 
sample period of 2014–2019 covering the revised 
version of CG code in Oman. In addition, we 
hand-collect a unique data on AC financial expertise 
for Omani financial institutions, from companies 
annual reports, to study their impact on corporate 
financial decisions. 
The remainder of the paper is structured as 
follows. Section 2 reviews the literature and develops 
the hypotheses. Section 3 presents the research 
design. Section 4 discusses the empirical results, 
whilst Section 5 presents the additional analysis. 
Section 6 concludes the study. 
 
2. LITERATURE REVIEW AND HYPOTHESES 
DEVELOPMENT 
 
In this section, we provide a brief survey of related 
studies on CG and corporate financial decisions.  
We then develop theoretical arguments for 
the relationships between AC financial expertise and 
dividends, financial leverage, and cash holdings. 
Consequently, we develop our research hypotheses. 
 
2.1. The effects of AC financial expertise on 
financial leverage 
 
As CG is a framework aiming to enhance 
transparency and accountability to shareholders, it 
is used to reduce the agency problems that existed 
due to the separation of control between agents and 
the principal (Feng, Hassan, & Elamer, 2020). Chang, 
Chou, and Huang (2014), Detthamrong et al. (2017), 
and Adusei and Obeng (2019) state that the level of 
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debt in companies is affected by the quality  
of CG. The literature finds that companies with weak 
CG are more leveraged than those with strong CG 
(Jiraporn, Kim, Kim, & Kitsabunnarat, 2012).  
Based on agency theory, high-quality CG can 
decrease the level of debt and in turn, reduce  
the conflict of interest between managers and 
shareholders. CG provides regulations and provisions 
to resolve disputes between agents and the principal 
and to assure the shareholders that the agents can 
manage funds to maximise firm value. 
One of the most important mechanisms to 
make a good CG is having a strong AC (Kusnadi, 
Leong, Suwardy, & Wang, 2016). “It is a sub-committee 
of the board of directors acting independently in 
the preparation of financial reports and accurate 
disclosure in compliant with reporting standards 
with internal control system and strong enough 
audit standards” (Detthamrong et al., 2017, p. 692). 
AC assists the board in choosing the appropriate 
external auditor, overseeing management, and 
enhancing the reliability in financial reporting 
quality (FRQ) (Sultana & Van der Zahn, 2015).  
There is growing research that AC financial expertise 
can enhance the effectiveness of the BODs. Based on 
resource dependence theory, AC financial expertise 
is likely to support corporate managers by using 
their unique skills and knowledge on financial, 
accounting, and supervisory experience (Kusnadi 
et al., 2016). They will provide all the necessary 
information to firms, which will allow them “to have 
better access to external sources of financing if 
needed” (Khatib, Abdullah, Hendrawaty, & Yahaya, 
2020). The impact of the financial expertise of AC on 
financial leverage could be positive or negative.  
On the one hand, financial experts could enable 
the company to increase its leverage due to better, 
reliable, and high-quality information provided to 
the markets. Based on a signalling theory, companies 
that issue more debt send a positive signal about 
their future outlooks (Rao et al., 2007). Rao et al. 
(2007) and Vijayakumaran and Vijayakumaran 
(2019) state that these firms, by issuing more debts, 
signal to the market their confidence in repaying 
their obligations also signal to the stock market 
their willingness to be monitored by lenders. This 
will increase their future investment opportunities 
and growth prospects. On the other hand, AC 
financial expertise could reduce the level of leverage 
to avoid potential shortcomings, losing control or 
reputation (Khatib et al., 2020). Also, AC financial 
expertise provides additional supervision on 
the management team, which could “lead managers 
to adopt lower leverage to avoid pressures related to 
commitments to surrender large amounts of cash” 
(Feng et al., 2020, p. 763). 
Based on the earlier arguments and agency, 
resource dependence, and signalling theories, we 
formulate the following hypothesis: 
H1: AC financial expertise has an impact on 
financial leverage. 
 
2.2. The effects of AC financial expertise on 
dividend policy 
 
AC financial expertise plays a major role in making 
optimal financial decisions such as dividend payout 
ratio due to their professional expertise and 
knowledge from past working experience in dividend 
payout capacity, tax planning, and corporate 
financial conditions, which help the board in 
advising and monitoring management team  
(Qiao et al., 2018). In a situation where a company is 
undervalued and information asymmetry between 
managers and shareholders is high, managers could 
signal this information by increasing the dividend 
payment level, based on signalling theory  
(Qiao et al., 2018; Baker, Dewasiri, Premaratne, & 
Koralalage, 2020). Therefore, AC financial expertise 
plays a major role in alleviating information 
asymmetry between the management and 
shareholders, leading to cost efficiency and improves 
a company’s competitive advantages and financial 
performance (Shamsabadi, Tebourbi, Nourani, & Min, 
in press). They state that this increase in firm’s 
performance will lead to a large dividend payout to 
shareholders, which ultimately achieving the CG 
goal, which is the maximisation of shareholders’ 
wealth.  
On the one hand, based on agency theory,  
one method of financial expertise to reduce 
information asymmetry is to use accounting 
conservatism to monitor and control managerial 
opportunistic behaviour (Sultana, 2015). This will 
lead to strengthening the internal monitoring 
responsibility exercised by them, which in turn 
improves FRQ. Using a strong conservatism means 
restricting the dividend payout to avoid default in 
debt payment (Watts, 2003). In this situation, 
financial expertise with their unique resources and 
high-quality experience could act as a substitute for 
paying the dividend, motivating lower demand for 
dividends in the firms. Krishnan and Visvanathan 
(2008) find that accounting experts enhance 
accounting conservatism through their specific 
knowledge of accounting matters. Previous studies 
find that strong CG reduces the level of dividend 
payment (Jiraporn & Ning, 2006; Jo & Pan, 2009).  
On the other hand, based on signalling theory, 
AC financial expertise tends to encourage paying 
a high level of dividends to better signal corporate 
future earnings sustainability (Qiao et al., 2018). 
“The dividend signaling theory is based on the belief 
that investors prefer stable dividends over the years 
and firms are reluctant to cut dividends” 
(Al-Yahyaee, Pham, & Walter, 2010, p. 906). Also, in 
situations where information asymmetry is high 
between managers and shareholders, the formers try 
to seek strategic advice from AC financial experts to 
adjust dividend policies through their advisory roles 
to signal good CG to the markets. The literature 
finds that larger dividend pay-out is associated with 
strong CG (Jiraporn, Kim, & Kim, 2011; Elmagrhi et al., 
2017; Shamsabadi et al., in press; Baker et al., 2020). 
Due to the inconclusive arguments about 
the impact of AC financial expertise on dividend 
policy and based on agency and signalling theories, 
we propose the following hypothesis: 
H2: AC financial expertise has an impact on 
dividend payment levels. 
 
2.3. The effects of AC financial expertise on 
cash holdings 
 
There are two opposite arguments about the impact 
of AC members with financial expertise on the value 
of cash holdings. On the one hand, AC financial 
expertise could affect positively the level of cash 
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holdings by mitigating the agency problems between 
managers and shareholders and through their 
effective monitoring and controlling of management 
actions in operating or investment activities by using 
their unique accounting and financial experience 
(Choi, Han, Jung, & Song, 2020). Based on resource 
dependence theory, AC with financial expertise 
extracts their human capital resources from  
other directorships, which lead to an increase  
in their effectiveness in overseeing FRQ and  
the management team (Pfeffer, 1972). Literature 
provides evidence that AC members with financial 
expertise enhance the monitoring role of AC, which 
lead to enhance FRQ (such as reducing the likelihood 
of asset misappropriation, improving audit quality 
and lowering earning management) (Xie, Davidson, & 
DaDalt, 2003; Zhang, Zhou, & Zhou, 2007; Hoitash & 
Hoitash, 2009; Dhaliwal, Naiker, & Navissi, 2010; 
Badolato, Donelson, & Ege, 2014; Cohen, Hoitash, 
Krishnamoorthy, & Wright, 2014; Zalata, Tauringana, 
& Tingbani, 2018; Lisic, Myers, Seidel, & Zhou, 2019; 
Bala, Amran, & Shaari, 2019). Al-Hadi et al. (2020) 
find that members with professional expertise on 
boards are enhancing the level of cash holdings in 
GCC companies.  
On the other hand, AC financial expertise could 
have a strong connection with management through 
business and industry relationships, which might 
reduce the motivation to monitor the management 
and financial reporting processes effectively 
(Dhaliwal et al., 2010). This will result in a low level 
of cash holdings in the company because these 
members could “provoke the free cash flow problem” 
(Choi et al., 2020). Huang, Ma, and Lan (2014)  
find that firms with high information asymmetry 
characterised by a low level of cash holdings.  
In addition, Al-Najjar and Clark (2017) find  
an insignificant impact of independent directors on 
cash holdings in the Middle East and North Africa 
(MENA) region due to the networking and connection 
procedures in hiring directors instead of considering 
their expertise and experience.  
Based on the agency and resource dependence 
theories and the above-mentioned arguments, we 
propose the following hypothesis:  
H3: AC financial expertise has an impact on 
cash holdings. 
 
3. RESEARCH DESIGN 
 
3.1. Sample selection 
 
Our initial sample comprises Omani financial 
institutions listed on the Muscat Stock Exchange 
(MSX) from 2014 to 2019. We hand-collect 
information about AC members from companies 
annual reports downloaded from the MSX website.  
We obtain financial data from the Bloomberg 
database. The final sample consists of 216 firm-year 
observations. This period is selected as it includes 
the period of the introduction of the revised version 
of the Omani CG Code in 2016. The revised  
version gives the importance of including financial/
accounting expertise within ACs. The sampled 
population contain 8 banks, 10 insurance companies, 
5 financial services, 12 investment firms, and 1 real 
estate, which totaled 36 companies over a 6-years 
period. The financial sector accounts for 67% of 
the total MSX market (Muscat Clearing & Depository, 
2021). Table 1 shows the distribution of the financial 
sub-sectors within the MSX market. 
 
Table 1. Distribution of the financial sub-sectors 
 
Sub-sector Percentage (%) 
Banking 53.05% 
Financial services 5.21% 
Insurance 2.66% 
Investment 6.05% 
Real estate 0.01% 
Total 67% 
Source: Muscat Clearing & Depository (2021). 
 
We choose the financial sector “as it is heavily 
regulated by two bodies, namely the CMA and 
the Central Bank of Oman (CBO), and also considered 
to be the backbone of the whole economy in 
the general and non-financial sector in particular” 
(Al Lawati et al., 2021, p. 12). 
 
3.2. Regression models 
 
To examine the association between the presence of 
financial experts on ACs and corporate financial 
decisions, we estimate the following equations. 
Model 1 is used to examine the impact of AC 
with financial expertise on capital structure. 
Model 1 
 
𝐿𝐸𝑉 =  𝛼 +  𝛽1𝐴𝐶𝐹𝑖𝑛 + 𝛽2𝐴𝐶𝑀𝑒𝑒𝑡 + 𝛽3𝐴𝐶𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒 + 𝛽4𝑂𝑣𝐴𝐶 + 𝛽5𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡 +  𝛽6𝑅𝑂𝐸 +  𝛽7𝐵𝑖𝑔4 +
 𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑦 𝑓𝑖𝑥𝑒𝑑 𝑒𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑐𝑡 +  𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟 𝑓𝑖𝑥𝑒𝑑 𝑒𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑐𝑡 +  е  
(1) 
 
where, LEV refers to firm leverage; ACFin refers to 
AC directors with financial expertise; ACMeet refers 
to the number of AC meetings; ACSize refers to  
the number of AC members; OvAC refers to  
the overlapped AC members within a company; 
Total Asset refers to firm size; ROE refers to  
firm profitability; Big4 takes the value of 1 if 
the company’s financial statements are audited by 
one of the Big 4 external auditors and 0 otherwise. 
Model 2 is used to examine the impact of AC 















𝐷𝐼𝑉 =  𝛼 +  𝛽1𝐴𝐶𝐹𝑖𝑛 +  𝛽2𝐴𝐶𝑀𝑒𝑒𝑡 + 𝛽3𝐴𝐶𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒 + 𝛽4𝑂𝑣𝐴𝐶 + 𝛽5𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡 +  𝛽6𝑅𝑂𝐸 +  𝛽7𝐿𝐸𝑉 
+  𝛽8𝐵𝑖𝑔4 +  𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑦 𝑓𝑖𝑥𝑒𝑑 𝑒𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑐𝑡 +  𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟 𝑓𝑖𝑥𝑒𝑑 𝑒𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑐𝑡 + е 
(2) 
 
where, DIV refers to the amount of dividend paid 
in year t; ACFin refers to AC directors with  
financial expertise; ACMeet refers to the number  
of AC meetings; ACSize refers to the number of  
AC members; OvAC refers to the overlapped AC 
members within a company; Total Asset refers to 
firm size; ROE refers to firm profitability; LEV refers 
to firm leverage; Big4 takes the value of 1 if 
the company’s financial statements are audited by 
one of the Big 4 external auditors and 0 otherwise. 
Model 3 is used to examine the impact of AC 




𝐶𝑎𝑠ℎ =  𝛼 + 𝛽1𝐴𝐶𝐹𝑖𝑛 + 𝛽2𝐴𝐶𝑀𝑒𝑒𝑡 + 𝛽3𝐴𝐶𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒 +  𝛽4𝑂𝑣𝐴𝐶 + 𝛽5𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡 + 𝛽6𝑅𝑂𝐸 +
 𝛽7𝐿𝐸𝑉 + 𝛽8𝐵𝑖𝑔4 +  𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑦 𝑓𝑖𝑥𝑒𝑑 𝑒𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑐𝑡 +  𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟 𝑓𝑖𝑥𝑒𝑑 𝑒𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑐𝑡 + е  
(3) 
 
where, Cash refers to the amount of excessive free 
cash in the firm; ACFin refers to AC directors with 
financial expertise; ACMeet refers to the number of 
AC meetings; ACSize refers to the number of AC 
members; OvAC refers to the overlapped AC 
members within a company; Total Asset refers to 
firm size; ROE refers to firm profitability; LEV refers 
to firm leverage; Big4 takes the value of 1 if 
the company’s financial statements are audited by 
one of the Big 4 external auditors and 0 otherwise. 
 
3.3. Variable: Measurement and description 
 
The dependent variables for Models 1, 2, and 3: 
Capital structure, dividend payment, and cash 
holdings 
 
For Model 1, to measure firm capital structure, 
proxied by its leverage, which is the ratio of total 
debt to total assets following Vithessonthi and 
Tongurai (2015) and Detthamrong et al. (2017).  
For Model 2, the dividend pay-out is defined 
and measured as the aggregated declared dividends 
of a company paid out per year following  
Elmagrhi et al. (2017). We measure the dividend ratio 
by dividing the dividend paid to total assets 
following Jiraporn et al. (2011).  
For Model 3, the dependent variable is cash 
holdings, which is measured as cash to total assets 
following Bates, Kahle, and Stulz (2009), Martínez-
Sola, García-Teruel, and Martínez-Solano (2013), and 




We classify AC directors as a financial expert (ACFin) 
following Al Lawati et al. (2021) “as those who are 
certified public accountants (CPAs) or have prior 
work experience as a chief financial officer (CFO), 
vice president of finance, financial controller, 
investment banker, chief investment officer, 
financial analyst, auditor, or any other corporate 
finance or major accounting position” (p. 17).  
We measure ACFin as the percentage of AC directors 
with financial expertise to the total number of AC 
members in a firm. 
The Sarbanes-Oxley Act defined the term  
“AC financial expertise” as an individual possessing 
all of the following attributes: 
 “An understanding of GAAP and financial 
statements; 
 The ability to assess the general application of 
GAAP to accounting for estimates, accruals, and 
reserves; 
 Experience preparing, auditing, analyzing, or 
evaluating financial statements of a breadth and level 
of accounting complexity generally comparable to 
that expected to be present in the company’s financial 
statements (or experience actively supervising others 
engaged in such activities); 
 An understanding of internal control over 
financial reporting; and 
 An understanding of audit committee 
functions” (SEC, 2003). 
This individual “AC financial expertise” must 
have possessed the preceding attributes “through 
education and experience as a public accountant or 
auditor or a principal financial officer, or controller, 
or principal accounting officer of an issuer, or from 
a position involving the performance of similar 




Following corporate financial decisions studies  
(e.g., Elmagrhi et al., 2017; Qiao et al., 2018;  
Choi et al., 2020; Al-Hadi et al., 2020), we control for 
common firm characteristics and AC characteristics 
that could affect the dependent variables of our 
study (dividends pay-out, capital structure, and cash 
holdings), such as firm profitability (ROE), firm size 
(LogAsset) measured by the natural logarithm of 
total assets, Big 4 measured by dichotomous 
variable equal to 1 if the company is audited by 
Big 4 auditor and 0 otherwise, (ACSize), which refers 
to the number of members in the AC, (ACMeet), 
which refers to the number of meetings held by  
the AC and Busy directors (OvAC) refers to 
the proportion of AC members who also sit on 
different committees within a company. 
Further details on the literature used to support 
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Table 2. Control variables definitions and measurements 
 
Dividend payment Measurement Previous literature 
Control variables 
Firm profitability Return on equity (ROE) 
Caskey and Hanlon (2013), Elmagrhi et al. (2017), 
Qiao et al. (2018), Shamsabadi et al. (in press), 
Baker et al. (2020) 
Firm size The natural logarithm of total assets 
Caskey and Hanlon (2013), Elmagrhi et al. (2017), 
Qiao et al. (2018), Shamsabadi et al. (in press), 
Baker et al. (2020) 
Firm leverage Total debts to total assets 
Caskey and Hanlon (2013), Elmagrhi et al. (2017), 
Qiao et al. (2018), Shamsabadi et al. (in press), 
Baker et al. (2020) 
Big 4 
Dummy variable: takes the value of 1 if 
the company’s financial statements are 
audited by one of the Big 4; 0 otherwise 
Shamsabadi et al. (in press), Baker et al. (2020) 
AC Size No. of AC directors 
Elmagrhi et al. (2017), Shamsabadi et al. (in press), 
Baker et al. (2020) 
AC Meeting No. of AC meetings 
Elmagrhi et al. (2017), Shamsabadi et al. (in press), 
Baker et al. (2020) 
Overlapped (busy) membership 
Directors being busy setting on different 
committees 
Al-Najjar and Hussainey (2009) 
Cash holdings Measurement Previous literature 
Control variables 
Firm profitability ROE 
Al-Najjar and Clark (2017), Choi et al. (2020), 
Al-Hadi et al. (2020) 
Firm size The natural logarithm of total assets 
Al-Najjar and Clark (2017), Choi et al. (2020), 
Al-Hadi et al. (2020) 
Firm leverage Total debts to total assets 
Al-Najjar and Clark (2017), Choi et al. (2020), 
Al-Hadi et al. (2020) 
Big 4 
Dummy variable: takes the value of 1 if 
the company’s financial statements are 
audited by one of the Big 4; 0 otherwise 
Choi et al. (2020) 
AC Size No. of AC directors Choi et al. (2020), Al-Hadi et al. (2020) 
AC Meeting No. of AC meetings Choi et al. (2020) 
Overlapped (busy) membership 
Directors being busy setting on different 
committees 
Chou and Feng (2019) 
Capital structure Measurement Previous literature 
Control variables 
Firm profitability ROE 
Fernandez et al. (2013), Al Ani and Al Amri (2015), 
Singh (2016) 
Firm size The natural logarithm of total assets 
Fernandez et al. (2013), Al Ani and Al Amri (2015), 
Singh (2016) 
Big 4 
Dummy variable: takes the value of 1 if 
the company’s financial statements are 
audited by one of the Big 4; 0 otherwise 
Elghuweel (2015) 
AC Size No. of AC directors Elghuweel (2015) 
AC Meeting No. of AC meetings Elghuweel (2015) 
Overlapped (busy) membership 
Directors being busy setting on different 
committees 




4.1. Descriptive statistics 
 
Table 3 presents the descriptive statistics. Our study 
reveals that firm leverage has a mean value of 16%, 
which is approximately close to what has been 
reported by Khaki and Akin (2020) in the GCC 
context of 19%. The mean value of the cash holdings 
is 6% of the total assets, indicating that Omani 
financial firms hold a low amount of cash during 
the sample period. The value is low compared to 
what Al-Hadi et al. (2020) find in the GCC, which is 
about 12%. The mean value of the dividend ratio 
is 1%, which is higher than the dividend ratio reported 
in GCC about 4%. The average value of AC with 
financial expertise is 73%, with a maximum of 100% 
and a minimum of 0. This indicates that still there 
are some Omani financial companies that are not 
following the CG provision in hiring at least one 
member with financial/accounting expertise on AC. 
The mean values of the control variables are overall 
consistent with a recent study conducted on Omani 
financial firms (Al Lawati et al., 2021).  
 
Table 3. Descriptive statistics 
 
Variables Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
CashRatio 0.06 0.09 -0.33 0.76 
ACFin 0.73 0.28 0.00 1.00 
ACMeet 4.82 1.60 0.00 12.00 
ACSize 3.38 0.58 2.00 6.00 
OvAC 0.36 0.32 0.00 1.00 
LogAsset 2.05 0.92 -0.40 4.10 
ROE 2.21 31.93 -251.20 37.41 
LEVTDTA 16.38 21.88 0.00 69.58 
Big4 0.89 0.31 0.00 1.00 
Dividend 5,063.75 12,647.77 0.00 103,159.00 
DividendRatio 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.08 
Note: See subsection 3.3 for variable definitions. 
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4.2. Correlation analysis 
 
Table 4 presents the Pearson correlation analysis. 
There is a positive correlation between AC financial 
expertise and capital structure. However, no 
significant correlations have been found between 
AC financial expertise and the other dependent 
variables (cash holdings and dividend payment).  
The variables are free from the multicollinearity 
problem as the correlation coefficients between all 
the variables are less than 0.7. 
 
Table 4. Correlation analysis 
 
Variables 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
1 Cash Ratio (%) 1 
         
2 LEV (TD/TA) -0.169* 1 
        
3 Dividend Ratio (%) -0.069 0.146* 1 
       
4 ACFin(%) 0.071 0.146* -0.063 1 
      
5 ACMeet 0.098 -0.011 0.010 0.006 1 
     
6 ACSize -0.028 0.021 0.072 0.069 0.008 1 
    
7 OvAC (%) 0.162* -0.189** 0.007 -0.060 0.256** -0.052 1 
   
8 LogAsset 0.231** 0.171* -0.086 0.178** 0.367** 0.065 0.227** 1 
  
9 ROE% 0.032 0.090 0.126 -0.027 0.104 0.113 0.016 0.355** 1 
 
10 Big4 0.071 0.200** 0.004 0.034 0.196** 0.047 0.132 0.444** 0.381** 1 
Notes: * Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed). ** Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). 
 
4.3. Regression analysis 
 
Table 5 reports our empirical findings. Model 1 tests 
H1, which examines the impact of AC financial 
expertise on capital structure. Model 2 tests H2, 
which investigates the impact of AC financial 
expertise on dividend policy. Model 3 tests H3, which 
investigates the influence of AC financial expertise 
on cash holdings. All models are significant, with 
Prob > F values are less than 0.01, reflecting their 
validity.  
 
4.3.1. The impact of AC with financial expertise on 
corporate capital structure 
 
In Model 1 the coefficient of AC with financial 
expertise is positive and significant with firm 
leverage at the confidence level of 90%. Hence, 
we accept H1. The result is consistent with resource 
dependence theory and Detthamrong et al. (2017), 
which state that directors with professional 
experience and unique resources that they have, 
could increase the access to issue more debt 
through their network channels inside and outside 
of the company. This will enable them to provide 
reliable information to the firms’ users and decrease 
agency conflicts and problems between managers and 
shareholders. This is consistent with Rao et al. (2007) 
who state that directors of confident firms are 
issuing more debt instead of equity to signal  
firms growth prospects and enhance shareholder 
wealth maximisation instead of spreading risks 
among equity holders.  
Moving to control variables, we find that firm 
size and audit firm reputation (Big 4) are positively  
and significantly influencing firm leverage at  
the confidence level of 90% and 95% respectively.  
The findings are consistent with Detthamrong et al. 
(2017). Large firms tend to have a high percentage of 
debts. As receiving bank loans require firms to use 
their fixed assets as collateral, therefore, large firms 
are likely to be more financially permitted 
(Megginson, Ullah, & Wei, 2014). They do not have 
to hold more cash to protect themselves from any 
potential of unforeseen liquidity shocks. Also, 
companies whose financial statements are audited 
by Big 4 audit firms provide vital additional 
knowledge about the firm’s credit risk to the capital 
providers. This information could lead to  
strength the credit approval, hence increasing  
the opportunities of getting more loans. However, 
we find a negative effect of overlapping AC 
membership on firm leverage at the confidence level 
of 99%. This could be due that busy, overlapped 
directors will try to protect their reputation by 
playing an important role in lessening investors’ 
information and credit risks, and therefore reducing 
a firm’s cost of capital (Trinh et al., 2020).  
 
4.3.2. The impact of AC with financial expertise on 
dividend policy 
 
In Model 2 we find that AC members with financial 
expertise positively and significantly affect the level 
of dividend payment policy in Omani financial  
firms at the confidence level of 90%. Therefore, H2 
has been accepted. Consisting with signalling theory 
and with previous studies (Jiraporn et al., 2011;  
Qiao et al., 2018), we find that financial experts use 
their professional experience in providing suitable 
strategic advice to adjust dividend policies through 
their advisory roles by paying larger dividends to 
signal the good CG to the markets. This will help in 
preventing managers from using these funds to 
benefit their interests or investing in negative net 
present value projects. 
Moving to the control variables, we find that 
ACMeet and ACSize are positively and significantly 
affecting the level of dividend payment at 
the confidence levels of 90% and 99%, respectively. 
This is consistent with Jiraporn et al. (2011) who 
find that strong CG increases the level of dividend 
payment. However, we find that overlapping AC 
members are negatively and significantly affecting 
the level of dividend policy at the confidence level of 
99%. This could be due to the comprehensive and 
thorough knowledge they possess from serving on 
different committees which lead them to reduce the 
agency problems by using accounting conservatism 
to monitor and control managerial opportunistic 
behaviour. Regarding firm characteristics, we find 
that firm profitability and leverage negatively affect 
dividend policy at the confidence level of 95% and 
99%, respectively. This is due to the role they play in 
“mitigating agency costs and because of debt 
covenants on dividends imposed by debtholders” 
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(Jiraporn et al., 2011, p. 265). This could be 
explained that profitable firms are preferring to use 
their profits to maintain their earnings and fund 
more positive net present value projects rather than 
paying dividends (Al-Najjar & Belghitar, 2011).  
Also, leverage firms pay less dividends to signal to 
shareholders the accurate situation of the company, 
which leads them to maintain their good reputation 
in the market of being transparent and truthful. 
Moreover, we find a positive relationship between 
firm size and dividend payment at the confidence 
level of 99%. This indicates that large firms reach 
the maturity stage and therefore they are able to pay 
dividends comfortably (Al-Najjar & Belghitar, 2011).   
 
4.3.3. The impact of AC with financial expertise 
on cash holdings 
 
In Model 3, the estimated coefficient of ACFin 
is positive and significant with cash holdings at  
the confidence level of 90%, consisting of agency 
theory. Therefore, we accept H3. The result indicates 
that the existence of professional members as 
financial experts on AC will increase the monitoring 
and controlling of managerial investment decisions 
and hence will increase the level of cash holdings. 
The finding is consistent with Al-Hadi et al. (2020) 
who find that “members with greater monitoring 
and financial expertise increase firms’ level of cash 
holdings by ensuring that value-increasing NPV 
projects are funded” (p. 11).  
With regard to control variables, we find that 
firm profitability and leverage are negatively 
associated with the level of cash holdings  
at the confidence level of 99%, consistent with  
Al-Hadi et al. (2020) findings in GCC. This could be 
due to that profitable firms could easily use their 
profits to finance their future investments instead  
of depending on external sources to raise funds 
(Al-Najjar & Belghitar, 2011). In addition, we provide 
evidence that firms with a high leverage ratio 
indicate their good reputation in the market of 
successful ability to raise funds externally, which 
lead them to have a lower level of cash holdings. 
This also could be due to that leverage and cash are 
considered to be substitutes for each other 
(Megginson et al., 2014). We also find a positive 
relationship between firm size and the level of cash 
holdings at the confidence level of 99%, in line with 
Al-Najjar and Clark’s (2017) results in the MENA 
region. This indicates that large firms stockpile more 
cash to finance their investment projects due  
to the limited capacity of external financing in 
the MENA region (due to a weak economic situation).  
 
Table 5. Regression analyses 
 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
Capital structure Dividend payment Cash holdings 
Variables Coefficients Significance Variables Coefficients Significance Variables Coefficients Significance 
ACFin 7.985* 0.100 ACFin 0.0759* 0.090 ACFin 0.039* 0.095 
ACMeet -0.555 0.570 ACMeet 0.1893* 0.094 ACMeet 0.002 0.636 
ACSize -0.515 0.835 ACSize 0.2282*** 0.001 ACSize -0.010 0.349 
OvAC -15.858*** 0.001 OvAC -0.1253*** 0.000 OvAC 0.018 0.416 
LogAsset 3.552* 0.067 LogAsset 1.7458*** 0.000 LogAsset 0.041*** 0.004 
ROE -0.012 0.808 ROE -0.0027** 0.030 ROE -0.001*** 0.001 
Big4 12.413** 0.021 LEVTDTA -0.0032*** 0.011 LEVTDTA -0.002*** 0.000 
_cons 2.324 0.827 Big4 -0.2099* 0.080 Big4 0.006 0.800 




























Prob > F 0 Prob > F 0 Prob > F 0 
R2 0.12 R2 0.47 R2 0.23 
Notes: * coefficient is significant at 10%; ** coefficient is significant at 5%; *** coefficient is significant at 1%; See subsection 3.3 for 
variable definitions. 
 
5. ADDITIONAL ANALYSIS: IMPACT OF AC 
SUPERVISORY EXPERTISE ON CORPORATE 
FINANCIAL DECISIONS 
 
One category of financial experts is supervisory 
experts, and they are considered a large portion of 
AC financial experts (Choi et al., 2020). Omani CMA 
regulators call for diversifying AC members with 
different and rich expertise (Al Lawati et al., 2021).  
We examine further the role of supervisory expertise 
on ACs (ACSup) on corporate financial decisions.  
On the one hand, based on resource dependence 
theory, AC supervisory experts are complementing 
the role of financial experts and enhancing 
the monitoring role of AC by utilising their unique 
past work experience (Kusnadi et al., 2016).  
Several studies find a positive relationship between 
supervisory experts and corporate decisions (Goh, 
2009; Hoitash & Hoitash, 2009; Mustafa & Ben 
Youssef, 2010; Cohen et al., 2014; Faleye, Hoitash, & 
Hoitash, 2018). 
On the other hand, these members could impair 
the role of ACs in overseeing FRQ process as they 
lack specialized knowledge in the accounting and 
financial fields. Several studies find a negative 
relationship between these members and corporate 
decisions (Davidson et al., 2004; DeFond et al., 2005; 
Krishnan & Visvanathan, 2008; Naiker & Sharma, 
2009; Dhaliwal et al., 2010). 
We follow Kusnadi et al. (2016) and Al Lawati 
et al. (2021) in measuring AC supervisory expertise as 
“members with prior work experience in supervisory 
roles (ACSup) such as chief executive officers (CEO), 
chief operation officers (COO), chairman of a board 
of directors, or company presidents and or having 
more than 20 years of experience in their  
field” (Al Lawati et al., 2021, p. 23). We measure 
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the variable as the proportion of supervisory experts 
on AC to the total number of AC directors.  
The analysis is shown in Table 6. The table 
shows that AC directors with supervisory expertise 
are positively and significantly affecting corporate 
financial decisions (leverage at confidence level 
of 99%, dividend payment at confidence level of 90%, 
and cash holdings at confidence level of 95%).  
The results are consistent with agency, resources 
dependence and signalling theories and with 
previous studies (Kusnadi et al., 2016; Faleye et al., 
2018), which state that these members are 
complementing and adding to the role played by AC 
financial experts and improving their overseeing role 
by utilising their distinctive past work experience in 
providing suitable and better financial decisions to 
the board and company’s managers. 
 
Table 6. Impact of AC supervisory expertise on financial decisions 
 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
Capital structure Dividend payment Cash holdings 
Variables Coefficients Significance Variables Coefficients Significance Variables Coefficients Significance 
ACSup 16.573*** 0.010 ACSup 0.051* 0.090 ACSup 0.065** 0.020 
ACMeet -1.132 0.251 ACMeet 0.190** 0.052 ACMeet -0.003 0.471 
ACSize 0.110 0.964 ACSize 0.228*** 0.001 ACSize -0.004 0.720 
OvAC -16.718*** 0.000 OvAC -0.134*** 0.000 OvAC 0.016 0.425 
LogAsset 4.283** 0.023 LogAsset 1.740*** 0.000 LogAsset 0.028*** 0.001 
ROE -0.005 0.918 ROE -0.003*** 0.013 ROE -0.0001 0.737 
Big4 12.306** 0.021 LEVTDTA -0.003** 0.037 LEVTDTA -0.001*** 0.001 
_cons -4.165 0.704 Big4 -0.209* 0.064 Big4 0.002 0.925 




























Prob > F 0 Prob > F 0 Prob > F 0 
R2 0.14 R2 0.48 R2 0.13 





This paper examines the impact of AC directors with 
financial expertise on corporate financial decisions 
(capital structure, dividend policy, and cash holdings) 
within Omani financial firms. Oman provides 
an ideal context to investigate such relationships as 
the CG Code has given a significant focus on  
the characteristics of AC directors and has called for 
a diversity of experience within AC members to 
enhance their role in monitoring the management 
behaviours. Using data for the period 2014–2019,  
we find that AC directors with financial  
and supervisory expertise are positively affecting 
corporate financial decisions by providing 
supplementary monitoring and overseeing 
management investment decisions. Therefore, this 
will lead to an increase in the level of firm leverage, 
dividend payment, and cash holdings of the firms. 
The results indicate that shareholders perceive good 
CG as an effective mechanism for monitoring firms’ 
financial decisions, and companies with specialised 
directors on AC are in a better position to monitor 
and constrain opportunistic management behaviour. 
This paper contributes to the CG and financial 
decisions literature in several ways. It is the first 
study, to the best of our knowledge, to examine 
the effect of AC financial and supervisory expertise 
on corporate financial decisions in Oman, “which is 
characterized by generally weak investor protection, 
poor regulation quality and a weaker enforcement 
regime. These factors are likely to affect firms’ level 
of cash holdings, as cash reserves are typically used 
to safeguard a firm against adverse shocks”  
(Al-Hadi et al., 2020, p. 18). Also, we integrate 
several theories, namely, agency, signalling and 
resource dependence to explain the effect of 
the unique power of the financial and supervisory 
expertise on making useful financial decisions by 
the board. Moreover, using a recent time frame and 
data set of the CG in the context of Oman from 2014 
to 2019 contributed significantly to the literature as 
till to date there is a dearth of studies that have 
examined this time frame which includes 
the inauguration of the revised CG code (such as 
Al Lawati & Hussainey, in press; Al Lawati et al., 2021). 
The study offers a number of practical 
implications to regulators and academics.  
For regulators, the results show the significant role 
of AC financial and supervisory expertise in 
implementing high-quality financial decisions. 
Therefore, regulators in Oman should encourage 
financial firms to exceedingly appoint directors with 
professional and diversified experiences on AC to 
work as an effective tool to monitor management 
opportunistic behaviours. The study also provides 
important implications to other regulators of 
developing countries in situations of emerging 
different mandatory and voluntary committees 
within their firms. For academics, investigating 
the impact of characteristics of different committees’ 
members, such as risk and nomination and 
remuneration on financial decisions would be 
important in the context of Oman, given the fact 
that these committees are been mandated within 
the revised version of the Omani CG. 
The study is not free from limitations. Using 
one country would lessen the generalisability of 
findings. Future studies could extend the research to 
several developing countries such as GCC. Future 
research could also examine the effect of different 
characteristics of AC such as interlocked directors 
and female AC members on corporate financial 
decisions.
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